


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THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

A Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc
Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board

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Approved by the United
States Intelligence Board
11 July 1961

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MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

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THE PROBLEM

To assess the extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc military collaboration with the Castro regime, and to examine in detail the Cuban military buildup since Castro came to power.

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I
CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet Bloc continues to extend considerable military assistance to Cuba in the form of military equipment, training, and technicians and advisers. Thus far, aircraft consisting of MIG-type jets, some helicopters, light transports, piston trainers, and a wide assortment of armaments ranging from small arms through medium artillery and heavy tanks have been positively identified. There are tenuous indications that Cuba may receive some Soviet jet light bombers. An estimate of the total quantities and types of equipment received thus far is shown in Annexes, 1. and 2.

2. Some military equipment--such as a few Soviet T-54 medium tanks--which probably has been received in Cuba but that has not been positively identified or enumerated is not included in Annex 1.

3. There is no evidence that any nuclear weapons or guided missiles are now in Cuba. Military training of Cubans in the Bloc is continuing and some probably have already returned for duty in Cuba. Soviet Bloc military technicians and probably instructor pilots are in Cuba. No Chinese Communist military personnel have been identified as being in Cuba.

2. There is no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing a "volunteer" force for military service in Cuba.

3. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has gone a long way toward identifying itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. The viability of Cuba's economy has become dependent on continued Bloc

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assistance. The successful Soviet effort to provide Cuba with all its petroleum needs has been at considerable expense and disruption to its normal tanker operations and the Soviet Union has given priority to other Cuban needs even on occasion at the expense of other trading partners.

4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's support for the Castro regime is part of its larger efforts to isolate the United States and to weaken and eventually destroy its influence throughout the world. The Soviets desire to establish Cuba as a secure base of operations for furthering their aims throughout Latin America. The Castro regime has already become an effective instrument of the Bloc toward achieving these ends in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, among underdeveloped and emerging nations throughout the world. In short, for most practical purposes, the present Cuban Government can be regarded as Communist, and its military dependence on the Bloc is steadily increasing. Cuba, under the present Communist control, provides a better base of operations for subversion and propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. The strongly anti-United States and pro-Soviet regime of Castro's serves their purposes well; it gives a native color to Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention.

5. The Soviet Bloc military equipment already shipped to Cuba, as well as prior military purchases by Castro from Western sources, have contributed substantially to a major buildup of

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ground and air forces there. As a result, the Cuban ground forces are probably now better equipped than those of any other Latin American country. The Cuban military buildup is reflected in the great expansion of personnel in the Cuban military and militia forces. The present Cuban ground forces consist of the Revolutionary Army of approximately 32,000, the Revolutionary National Police of 9,000, and the militia estimated at more than 200,000. The combat effectiveness of the combat elements of the army and the militia has greatly improved since November 1960 and together they must now be considered as constituting one of the most effective ground forces in Latin America. Present capabilities of the Cuban Navy are limited to the patrol of selected portions of the coast. The combat capability of the Cuban Air Force is still low, but it can provide limited support to the ground forces and assist in maintaining internal security. However, with the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of Bloc-trained personnel, the capability of the air force will be greatly enhanced over the coming months. If augmented by aircraft of the civil airline, the Cuban Air Force has a fair troop and cargo transport capability.

6. Initially, the purpose of Cuba's military buildup was self defense. Anti-Castro guerrillas were active in several areas inside Cuba and exile groups had posed a constant invasion threat. However, the current sharpening and strengthening of all the instruments of police state control suggest that the related

motive of tightening the dictatorship is an equal, if not present-
 ly the prime, purpose of the military buildup. The regime, which
 is imposing a thorough socio-economic revolution on the country
 at a faster pace than almost any other government in history, evi-
 dently estimates that its domestic objectives can be achieved only
 through the regimentation of the Cuban people under a police state.
 This clearly parallels the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party
 and thus furthers the aims of the international Communist movement.

7. The militia is a primary instrument of the state in
 strengthening and extending its control. Drawn from rural and
 urban lower income groups, a hard core of the militia is well-
 equipped and is organized with increasing efficiency while a
 larger portion is undergoing regular part time military training.
 Some militia units have been assigned to duties normally carried
 out by the armed forces. The militia provides the government with
 a substantial armed force with which to control the populace as a
 whole and subjects a relatively large number of Cubans to military
 discipline and political indoctrination. At the same time, it
 contributes toward solving the serious unemployment problem. Com-
 munist influence in the militia is extensive. The militia has
 proven an effective fighting force in the anti-guerrilla campaigns
 in the Escambray mountains early this year and against the anti-
 Castro force that landed on 17 April. The effectiveness of the
 militia reflected an improved state of training, acceptable leader-
 ship, and generally good morale as well as the regime's ability to

mass large numbers of men in critical areas.

8. The Castro regime is convinced that the Cuban revolution is the vanguard of "the anti-imperialist rebellion" that will inevitably sweep all of Latin America. It is actively encouraging and covertly assisting Communist and Communist-influenced revolutionary groups in other Latin American countries at every opportunity. Its methods include intensive propaganda supported by the Castro-subsidized international news agency that has close working ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc news agencies and reflects the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping. Cuban diplomatic missions have frequently provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial assistance. The arms buildup in Cuba permits the Cubans to supply weapons to pro-Castro groups in other countries. Receipt of Bloc military equipment permits Cuba to furnish Western-manufactured arms now in their possession for this purpose.

9. Cuban subversion is further supported by the Castro-subsidized travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans who are exposed there to further political indoctrination and, according to frequent reports, given military training. During the Havana meeting in May and June 1961 of the executive committee of the Communist-front International Union of Students, it was announced that Cuba plans to offer 1,000 scholarships to Latin American students for study in Cuba.

II

DISCUSSION

1. Following the seizure of power by the Castro regime in January 1959, intermittent Cuban military contacts were made with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries--notably Czechoslovakia--but these apparently did not result in firm military aid commitments until the early summer of 1960. As Cuba's efforts to purchase military goods in the Free World became increasingly difficult throughout 1959 and early 1960, Cuban arms purchasing missions traveled to the Bloc to investigate new sources of supply. Discussions reportedly covered a whole range of equipment from small arms to modern jet aircraft.

2. These preliminary contacts may have crystallized during First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960, when Moscow abandoned its policy of aloofness toward the Cuban revolution and publicly announced its support of the Castro regime. Mikoyan's visit signaled the beginning of a series of trade and/or aid agreements between Cuba and all countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. As political and economic contacts were established, it became apparent that the Bloc intended to back up its propaganda support for Cuba with a major campaign of material assistance.

3. Soviet activities in exploiting the rapid deterioration of US-Cuban relations, however, were inhibited during the spring of 1960 by the impending summit conference and President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to the USSR. With the collapse of the summit in May and the cancellation of the President's trip, these inhibitions were removed and the Bloc launched a more intensive drive to expand its influence

over the Castro regime. In the post-summit period this campaign has included public attacks on the validity of the Monroe Doctrine and assurances of Soviet support in the event of economic or military measures that the US might undertake against Cuba. These assurances-- including the ambiguous references to retaliation with missiles-- have been phrased broadly enough to cover the supply of military equipment and technical assistance without committing the USSR to specific military action in support of Cuba.

4. Soon after the summit collapse in May 1960, Cuban military negotiations were undertaken with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Czech-Cuban talks in Havana during May and June were immediately followed up by a trip to Prague and Moscow by Cuban Minister of Armed Forces Raul Castro. Presumably agreements were concluded during these negotiations to provide for future deliveries of Bloc arms.

5. 

6. Further military talks during July and August probably were held concerning detailed arrangements for the delivery of Soviet Bloc arms, accompanied by military technicians to provide the necessary training. Not until September 1960, however, did major shipments get under way. Since 8 September 1960, there have been at least 16 shipments of military material to Cuba.

7. Because of the stringent security precautions surrounding the off-loading of military cargoes in Cuba, information on the exact total quantities of Bloc material is fragmentary. Shipments have consisted of MIG-type aircraft, helicopters, piston trainers, light transports, and a complete range of land armaments, including tanks, field and antiaircraft artillery, military vehicles, and large quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition, radar and communications equipment have been delivered. Total estimated value of these shipments is between \$60,000,000 and \$100,000,000. Considering the type of equipment and estimated Bloc deliveries, the Cuban ground forces are probably now better equipped than those of any other Latin American country. They will probably experience some initial difficulty in providing adequately trained maintenance personnel for this equipment. Over the long run some spare parts problems may arise. These estimated Bloc deliveries provide the Castro regime with suitable armaments for defensive purposes against external invasion by non-nuclear forces, as well as being very useful for Cuban internal security needs.

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(B)(3)

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9. Bloc military deliveries to Cuba thus far have significantly assisted the Castro regime in its attempts to develop a greater military capability. The Cuban ground forces now have for the first time an antiaircraft defense capability and a greatly improved artillery and armor capability. In addition, the considerable quantities of modern Bloc small arms and ammunition have enabled the regime to establish and maintain an expanding civilian militia. There is no evidence that any nuclear weapons or guided missiles are now in Cuba.

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(B)(3)

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together, between 150 and 200 Cubans have probably been receiving military training in Czechoslovakia, and a small number in the USSR.

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At least some of these have probably returned. It appears likely that cadets sent for pilot training in the Bloc had little previous military experience. If so, some of these student pilots may have received only preliminary flight instruction in Czechoslovakia and they may receive jet transition training on Bloc aircraft in Cuba.

11. Precise information is unavailable on the numbers and activities of Bloc military technicians in Cuba. Based primarily on Bloc military technical assistance to other non-Bloc countries and the estimated arms shipments to Cuba thus far, it is believed that over 300 Czech and Soviet technicians currently are working in military capacities for the Cuban government. Other reports have indicated that this number may be somewhat larger, but we believe that most of these have tended to be exaggerated. No Chinese Communist military personnel are believed to be in Cuba, although the possibility cannot be entirely discounted.

12. Soon after the arrival of the first large Bloc arms shipment in September 1960, Czech and Soviet technicians reportedly were assisting the Cuban military in assembling equipment and installing such weapons as antiaircraft batteries. They are employed also as instructors in military courses and as advisors to individual military units and as maintenance personnel.

13. There is no evidence that Soviet Bloc or other nationals are being trained in the Bloc for military duty in Cuba. There is no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing "volunteer" forces for military service in Cuba.

14. The ground forces under Batista consisted of a 21,000-man Army and a National Police Force of 7,600 who were relatively well-trained and well-disciplined by Latin American standards. Following Castro's victory, virtually all elements of Batista's ground forces were gradually removed. About one-fifth of the present Revolutionary Army of some 32,000 men were active in guerrilla operations against Batista, and the remainder is composed of personnel who joined the Revolutionary movement when its success had been assured. A similar situation is believed to exist in the 9,000-man Revolutionary National Police organization, which in May 1961 was placed under the newly-created Ministry of the Interior. Much of the Army effort since 1 January 1959 has been devoted to non-military activities; personnel assigned to public works projects account for much of the troop strength increase over Batista's army.

15. The capabilities of the Cuban ground forces have been increasing steadily since the fall of 1960. Soviet Bloc arms deliveries have provided Cuban ground forces with an armor, artillery, antiaircraft and antitank potential hitherto largely lacking and unknown in other countries of the Caribbean area. Intensive training of Army and Militia units with new Bloc equipment, under the supervision of Bloc advisors, has been conducted since the Fall of 1960. A modest school system including armor, field and antiaircraft artillery, infantry, guerrilla, medical and signal training has been instituted. In May 1961, Castro instituted a course to train a new corps of revolutionary instructors who will be assigned to troop units to

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raise the morale and increase the "revolutionary awareness" of all military elements. Field and antiaircraft artillery and tank firing exercises are conducted on a regular basis; unit firing exercises have been conducted. It is estimated that the combat elements of the Army and Militia have completed basic and small unit training and are capable of handling and firing all weapons with which they are equipped. Level of training of infantry units appears to vary widely. Armor units have probably achieved the capability of platoon employment. Recent operations against invading forces indicated that at least some combined arms training has been conducted. While tactical communications continue to be inadequate for modern combat, the delivery of large amounts of Bloc military transport vehicles has greatly increased the mobility of the Cuban ground forces as evidenced by the rapid deployment of combat elements to the invasion area in April.

16. The civilian Revolutionary Militia represents the major increase in the size and capability of Castro's ground forces over those available to Batista. It is estimated to have more than 200,000 members. First appearing as early as November 1959, loosely-organized units of students, workers, and farmers were officially established in early January 1960. Training varied widely from unit to unit and reflected the initiative and energy of individual commanders. In general, however, militia training has been more uniform and extensive than that conducted by the Army. While a sizeable proportion of the militia are volunteers,

there have been large numbers of young men and women pressured into service in the militia, and there are reports of a conscript program having been initiated.

#335 17. During 1960, militia units gradually assumed many duties which formerly were exclusively performed by the Army and National Police. They effectively performed crowd control duties, such as at the time of the Cayo Cruz ammunition dump explosion, and they have acted as security forces in port areas while Soviet Bloc arms shipments have been unloaded. In addition, they have effected the takeover of intervened businesses and are used in guarding vital industries and utilities against possible sabotage efforts. The rapid reaction of the Cuban Militia in concert with the National Police in establishing control of Cuban cities during the recent invasion attempt was a clear demonstration of their effectiveness. Recent reports indicate that the militia's role of controlling the populace may be supplanted by the Ministry of the Interior, which includes the Department of State Security, the National Police, and the Maritime Police, and which controls the Committees of Vigilance.

18. Beginning in November 1960, a reorganization was initiated with the design of producing better organized, more closely controlled battalions, commanded by Militia officers who were graduates of rugged OCS-type training. Uniforms and modern Soviet Bloc small arms are being issued all Militia units. Additionally, training of the Militia units on heavier Bloc equipment, and organization of

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Militia mortar and artillery units were started in early November. Personnel in these units function as full-time active duty militiamen; they are between 18 and 30 years of age and are volunteers to the maximum possible extent. Their level of training is equal to that of equivalent Cuban Army units. The combat effectiveness of the Militia has been partially tested in counter-guerrilla operations which have been successful in eliminating, at least for the present, the guerrilla threat to the Castro regime. In the Cochinos Bay operations, even though the Militia battalions initially employed were not the elite of the Militia forces, they were successful in containing the invaders until selected combat units arrived. While neither of the two cited operations was against a modern combat force it nonetheless must be concluded that by Latin American standards the Cuban ground force combat elements are effective and further that they could be defeated only by a modern substantial combined-arms force.

19. The Cuban Navy with a personnel strength of about 4,000, is composed of 5 PF (3 TACOMA class, 2 "184-foot PCE" class), 2 AG, 2 ATR, 9 YAG and 29 YP. Of these ships, at least 1 PF is non-operational due to the shortage of spare parts, the 2 ATR are laid up, and only some 20 YP are operational. On the other hand, an unknown number of private pleasure craft has been taken over by the navy and armed with light machine guns for use as patrol craft. The PGM BAIRE, sunk at Nueva Gerona on 17 April by rebel aircraft, is being raised but it is expected that it will be many months

before the ship is reconditioned. During the past two years the Cuban Navy has unsuccessfully attempted to acquire patrol craft in Western Europe. Recently there have been rumors that Cuba might receive naval ships, including destroyers, from the Soviet Bloc. As far as is known, no Cuban naval personnel have been sent to the Bloc for training [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(B)
(B)

The only Bloc equipment known to be in use in the Navy are anti-aircraft guns installed on at least one TACOMA class PF and possibly on others.

20. Present capabilities of the Cuban Navy are limited to the patrol of selected portions of the coast. The larger ships (5 PF, 1 AG) maintain a patrol of both coasts of Havana and Pinar del Rio provinces and the Isle of Pines. The remainder of the coast is patrolled by YP and other small craft. Combat effectiveness of the Navy is negligible. Crews consist of naval, Maritime Police and militia personnel, the latter manning anti-aircraft guns.

21. The combat capability of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) is still low, but it can provide limited support to the ground forces and assist in maintaining internal security. However, with the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of Bloc-trained personnel, the capability of the air force will be greatly enhanced

over the coming months. If augmented by aircraft of the civil airline, the Cuban air force has a fair troop and cargo transport capability.

22. The total personnel strength of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force remains unknown. It is currently estimated that there are about 25 experienced pilots in the air force and that approximately 100 air force personnel are or have been undergoing training in Soviet Bloc countries--primarily Czechoslovakia. Possibly as many as half of these have been receiving pilot training, and probably some are now jet qualified. Some training is probably being conducted in Cuba, but the types of training, instructors, and numbers participating are unidentified.

23. The total inventory of CRAF aircraft has increased since 1 January 1959, but there had been little change in the totals of combat-type aircraft until the recent arrival of an estimated 30-40 MIGs. The increase is reflected mainly in the MIGs, helicopters, piston trainer, and transport aircraft, with the latter probably representing expropriations of aircraft from private owners. There is no information concerning the serviceability rate of CRAF aircraft at the present time. (See Annex 2 for a breakdown by type of Cuban military aircraft in 1958 and at the present time.)

24. In Cuba there are 10 airfields, excluding the USN airfield on the Guantanamo Naval Base, with hard-surface runways 6,000' or more. All of these fields have runways that are capable

of supporting jet fighter operations. Parking and fuel facilities are generally limited at most of the airfields. This air facility system is more than adequate for the CRAF and would support a major increase therein. (See map, Annex 3)

25. Since early 1960, the Castro regime has made a serious effort to augment Cuban air facilities capabilities. Several new airfields have been built and many of the already existing facilities have been significantly improved. This construction is summarized as follows:

a. Managua--At Managua (22-58N/082-16W), 13.3 nautical miles SE of Havana, a new runway is under construction. Present dimensions are approximately 4,800' x 150', and the surface is gravel.

b. Sigüanea--Sigüanea airfield (21-37N/082-55W), on the Isle of Pines, has one runway which has recently been extended to 6,000'; its width is 150'. The surface is crushed marble over marble base. Construction appears to be temporarily suspended.

c. Cayo Largo--A natural-surface landing strip 3,090' x 135' has recently been prepared at approximately 21-37N/081-33W.

d. Santa Clara International--a new airfield is under construction at 22-29N/079-56W, about 8 nautical miles NNE of the old Santa Clara airfield. Present dimensions of grading work are estimated to be between 9300' and 9600' x 280'. Construction is progressing slowly. The runway is not completed but a portion is usable for light aircraft.

e. Playa Baracoa--The runway at Baracoa airfield, 23-02N/082-34W, formerly referred to as Domingo Rosillo, has been extended to 5,450'.

#335 f. Cienaga de Zapata--The landing strip at Soplillar airfield at 22-17N/081-08W had been extended from 5,500' to 6,700'. Its surface has been reported as probably hard packed sand and gravel. Considerable clearing and excavation at the SW end of the strip has been reported which could indicate preliminary preparation for additional construction and enlargement. A new airstrip is under construction near Jaguey Grande at 22-29N/081-08W. Dimensions are approximately 4,000' x 150', and the surface appears to be packed sand or gravel, which is ready for either macadam or concrete surfacing. A new airstrip is under construction in the Playa Giron at 22-04N/081-02W, and Cayo Ramona area at 22-09N/081-02W. Approximate dimensions are 4,100' x 90'; surface is probably rolled and crushed rock. About 3 miles west of San Blas at 22-07N/081-00W, an unidentified installation is under construction which may be a possible HF/DF site. The site consists of a circular depressed cleared area approximately 390' in diameter, which has four equally spaced lines of approximately 100' in length each. There are grading and clearing activities in the general area. This area suggests early stages of HF/DF construction.

g. Antonio Maceo airfield at 19-58N/75-52W--Concrete extensions have been completed at both ends of each runway. The

length of the main runway is approximately 7,430', and the secondary runway is approximately 4,485' long.

h. Jaime Gonzalez airfield at 22-10N/080-24W--Concrete extension is underway at both runways. The main runway is being extended to approximately 4,400' and the secondary runway is being extended to approximately 3,300'.

i. Jose Marti International--The runway is being extended to 10,600 feet and grading is under way. The southwestern two-thirds of the runway is being blacktopped. This extension is probably intended for increased commercial operations and possibly to include some military operations.

26. The principal objectives of the current military buildup are self-defense, internal security, and to a lesser extent the export of arms and trained men to other Latin American countries for revolutionary and subversive purposes. Given the Cuban emphasis on guerrilla warfare, a civilian militia, and subversion, the arms the Cubans have been receiving--especially the large quantities of small arms and automatic weapons--lend themselves to use in connection with all of these objectives. The weapons employed for defense against attack from abroad can be used with equal facility against internal subversion and anti-Castro rebel forces, to arm the militia, or to supply revolutionary groups located in or moving into other Latin American countries.

27. Cuba's efforts to strengthen its military posture have resulted, at least initially, from a genuine fear of foreign-based

invasion. Various Cuban statements indicate that Castro views another invasion of the island by anti-government Cubans, supported indirectly or covertly by the United States, as a probability.

28. In addition to reflecting a genuine fear of invasion, the heated and continuing Cuban charges of a US-supported invasion and their propaganda exploitation of the abortive 17 April landings have been part of a major propaganda effort to villify the United States. This effort is designed to enlist world sympathy for the cause of the Cuban David against the US Goliath, and to draw the attention of the Cuban people away from the economic difficulties which they now face and to prepare them for further sacrifices.


29. A well-equipped military force (with special emphasis on an elite, politically reliable hard core within the revolutionary militia) serves two principal functions in maintaining order within Cuba. First, it enables the regime to deal effectively with any anti-Castro rebels which might develop in Cuba. Second, it provides Castro with a means of extending government control over Cuban society--a policy which is presently considered at least of equal importance to the objective of self-defense.

30. The current buildup in arms may now be directed primarily toward extending the Castro government's control over Cuban society and institutions. The major tool of control is the Revolutionary Militia, which serves several purposes. It provides the government with a substantial armed force through

which the Cuban populace as a whole can be controlled, and it promotes loyalty to Castro by subjecting a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination under the leadership of people dedicated to the revolutionary government. Finally, the militia offers the government an organized work force for use in economic development and military construction projects, and to reduce the high unemployment which is plaguing the Castro regime.

31. Since Fidel Castro's assumption of power, Cuba has been involved in several attempts to overthrow other Caribbean governments. During 1959, the Castro regime sponsored or gave indirect support to invasion attempts against Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti. The military buildup provides Cuba with an increased ability to furnish military aid to Communist and pro-Communist revolutionary groups in these or other Latin American countries in the future. Soviet Bloc military equipment now in Cuba permits the use of older, Western-made equipment which would be difficult to trace, for these purposes.

32. Cuba has with heavy assistance from Communist funds put to work on its behalf a propaganda and subversive campaign of unprecedented proportions in Latin America. Cuban leaders and propaganda media repeatedly refer to the Cuban revolution as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist revolution that will "inevitably sweep" the rest of Latin America.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Castro regime has become an effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in its drive to weaken and eventually destroy US influence in Latin America as well as in other underdeveloped and emerging nations.

33. The Castro government has made no secret of its antipathy toward most of the governments of the other Latin American republics, charging that these governments do not represent the will of the people. It is clear that Cuba is determined to export its revolution to the rest of the hemisphere.

34. The Cuban government is engaged in organizing, financing, and training of revolutionary movements. One facet of Cuban assistance in the training of potential revolutionaries against other Latin American governments is the Castro regime's subsidization of travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans for purposes of ideological and military indoctrination. Numerous delegates to the Latin American Youth Congress in Cuba last summer, for instance, remained to participate in the international Communist-financed "International Work Brigade." The week-long congress of the youth section of the Cuban Popular Socialist (Communist) Party last April also brought delegates from a number of Latin American countries, as did the ceremonies in March marking the "Week of Solidarity with the Struggles of the Latin American

Peoples." The latter event, sponsored by the Communist-controlled labor arm of the Castro regime, ended with a manifesto calling for the initiation of an "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution in all of Latin America." This manifesto did not include any call for an open Communist revolution. During the Havana meeting in May and June 1961 of the executive committee of the Communist front International Union of Students, it was announced that Cuba plans to offer 1,000 scholarships to Latin American students for study in Cuba. It has frequently been reported that Latin Americans from various countries have received military training as well as political indoctrination in Cuba after participating in these events. Also frequently reported are instances where representatives of various Latin American Communist and pro-Communist organizations who are sent to Sino-Soviet Bloc countries for training spend a period of time in Cuba on the outward or the homeward leg of their journeys.

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35. A major effort to overthrow a Latin American government was the attempt in June 1959 to oust the unpopular Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. In this case the Cubans underestimated the strength of the Dominican regime. The two forces which landed in the Dominican Republic from Cuba--one by air and the other by sea--were trained and armed in Cuba and led into battle by officers of Castro's army. The group that landed on the Dominican coast was escorted there by units of the Cuban Navy. The invading forces, primarily composed of Dominican

exiles, included a heavy sprinkling of Communists.

36. The abortive "invasions" of Panama in April 1959 and of Haiti in August of the same year were by small groups from Cuba who evidently did not have high-level Cuban official support but in the Panamanian case, at least, the expedition's preparations and departure probably took place with the knowledge and approval of some Cuban authorities. Of the numerous rebel raids into Nicaragua, a few were equipped with weapons from Cuba and led by Nicaraguans who had sought Cuban support for their adventures. However, none of these efforts is believed to have been directed or fully supported by Cuba. In fact, Cuban leaders are known to have had difficulty with the highly factionalized Nicaraguan exile groups that had sought support in Cuba. The Cubans had difficulties in deciding on a "trustworthy" Nicaraguan group which at the same time had any significant revolutionary capability. Several Nicaraguan, as well as at least one Panamanian and one Haitian exile group, have been jailed in Cuba as they were preparing "invasions," evidently either because they were considered the "wrong" exiles or because their chances of success were estimated to be nil.

37. There is evidence that Cuban officials decided on a program of support for the Guatemalan Communist and pro-Communist revolutionaries. [REDACTED]

(B)(1)
(B)(3)

[REDACTED] Ex-President Arbenz of Guatemala is in Cuba and inaugurated a regular radio program beamed at Guatemala on 31 May 1961. Guatemalan Communist leader Pellecer recently returned to Guatemala from Cuba and Fortuny, former secretary general of the party, may also have left Cuba for Guatemala. In the case of Guatemala, as with other Latin American countries, the Cubans maintain that a genuine revolution can be achieved only after the regular armed forces are destroyed and the "masses" are armed, as in Cuba. In his frequent speeches in Cuba, Arbenz has repeatedly said that his greatest mistake was in not arming the people--an omission which permitted the "militarists," bought with "imperialist money," eventually to seize power and destroy the revolution.

38. The government of Venezuelan President Betancourt is another target for Cuban subversive action. Leftist Venezuelan deputy Fabricio Ojeda, who has spent considerable time in Cuba in recent months, is reported to have secured official Cuban support for an armed revolt in Venezuela.

39. Castro agents, of both Cuban and foreign nationality, are traveling from Cuba to Latin American countries to promote revolutionary activities. Their objectives range from courier missions to organizing of student, labor, and revolutionary groups and the carrying out of sabotage missions. Hector Aldama Accsta, head of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico, is

charged with the coordination of all revolutionary activities in Central America. The use of Cuban ambassadors to control these activities has been proven in a number of Latin American countries.

40. Intensive Cuban propaganda is furthered by Cuban diplomatic missions which in numerous cases, such as in Mexico, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Panama, have provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial support. Numerous reports connect the Cuban Embassy in most Latin American countries with the distribution of anti-US and pro-Castro propaganda and financial support to local "Friends of Cuba" societies and leftist organizations.

#335 41. The Cuban revolutionary line is also spread throughout Latin America through the facilities of the Castro-subsidized international news agency Prensa Latina, which has close working ties with the news agencies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This propaganda organization which has offices established in many Latin American countries disseminates the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping throughout Latin America. It frequently has distorted news stories so as to reflect unfavorably on the local government--a course which has evoked protests from the officials of several Latin American countries, including Mexico, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. A powerful new radio station was inaugurated in Cuba on 1 May to disseminate pro-Castro propaganda throughout the hemisphere.

42. The activities of Castro agents throughout the hemisphere have frequently resulted in countermeasures being taken by security and diplomatic authorities in many Latin American countries. In a number of cases, blatant attempts to undermine the sovereign rights of other Latin American governments have resulted in the arrest of pro-Castro agents and the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel.

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